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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals is proper 
pursuant to rules 3 and 4A of the Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is the original appeal from a decision 
rendered in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge 
Presiding. The Court, on April 4, 1988, entered a final 
order granting Defendant's Motion for a Summary Judgment 
and denying the Plaintiff's Motion for a Summary Judgment. 
The Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal in the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah on the 4th day of May, 
1988. On July 29, 1988, this case was poured-over to the 
Court of Appeals for disposition. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The Respondent submits that the issues on appeal 
before this Court are as follows: 
1. Whether the lower Court correctly ruled 
that the lease agreement contains terms that are clear and 
unequivocal on its face, and therefore unambiguous and 
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binding upon the parties. 
2. Whether the Lower Court correctly ruled 
that there was no unconscionability at the time the lease 
was entered into, and that the succeeding lessors failed 
to show present unconscionability. 
3. Whether the Lower Court correctly ruled 
that a succeeding lessor is bound by a lease agreement, 
whose terms are clear and unequivocal when the lease 
agreement specifically states that the agreement is 
binding upon successors in interest and when the successor 
has actual knowledge of the lease agreement. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
None 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff and Appellant, Lorraine Miller, 
filed a complaint on July 28, 1987, seeking a Declaratory 
Judgment against the Defendant and Respondent, R.O.A. 
General, Inc., (Reagan Outdoor Advertising). Miller 
attempted to terminate an advertising lease agreement 
entered into by Reagan Outdoor Advertising and Lorraine 
Miller's predecessor in interest, William Jennings. 
Appellant hoped to obtain a ruling that Reagan was 
2 
trespassing. 
The parties filed memoranda setting forth their 
respective position. On December 1, 1987, oral arguments 
were heard by Judge Uno. Following oral argument the 
Court requested supplemental information to assist the 
Court in its decision. On January 4, 1988, Judge Uno 
issued his Memorandum Decision, denying Miller's Motion 
and granting Reagan's Motion for a Summary Judgment. 
Accordingly, Reagan Outdoor Advertising's interest has 
been judicially recognized. 
Following entry of the Judgment with 
accompanying Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the 
Plaintiff timely filed her Notice of Appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Utah. The case has been transferred to the Utah 
Court of Appeals for disposition. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. The Defendant/Respondent, Reagan Outdoor 
Advertising, maintains an outdoor advertising structure, 
sometimes called a "billboard", on the premises located at 
2735 South, 20th East, in Salt Lake City, State of Utah. 
(R. 33) 
2. This outdoor advertising structure was 
erected pursuant to a lease agreement between Reagan and a 
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Mr. William M. Jennings, executed on April 29, 1977. 
(R.29) 
3e Subsequent to the execution of the lease 
agreement the property upon which the outdoor advertising 
structure was located was sold by Mr. Jennings to Gloria 
Erickson who thereafter sold the property to the 
Plaintiff/ Respondent, Lorraine Miller (hereinafter 
"Miller"). (R.79) At the time Miller acquired the 
subject premises she was aware of the lease agreement and 
that she was bound by its terms. (R.33-34, 91) 
4. Miller believed that the lease could not be 
"broken", but that it would "expire" in May of 1987. 
(R.35) 
5. Since acquiring the property Miller has 
received regular rental payments pursuant to the lease 
agreement. (R.36) 
6. Miller believed that she could terminate 
the lease after 10 years. (R.86) 
7. In parciyiaph 4 (unnumbered) of the subject 
lease agreement it provides: 
This lease shall continue on the same terms 
and conditions for a like successive period; 
thereafter, this lease shall continue in 
full force on the same terms and conditions 
for a like successive period or periods, 
unless lessor delivers to lessee notice of 
termination within 90 days of the end of 
said term. (R.29) 
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The Lower Court found that the Reagan Outdoor 
Advertising, Inc., contract (or lease agreement) was 
neither a long nor complicated contract. (R.220) 
8. Further, the Lower Court found that the 
terms of the contract were clear and unequivocal; that the 
term of the lease was designated in a separate paragraph 
in plain and understandable language; and, the agreement 
consisting of only one page could be read, very slowly, in 
five (5) minutes. (R.222) 
9. The Lower Court found that there is no 
question that the lease is a 10 year lease and, more 
importantly, that upon careful reading of the lease 
anyone, including a lay person, would understand that 
there is an option to continue the lease for a "like 
successive period" to be exercised by the lessee. (R.222) 
10. The Court found that some attention was 
paid to this term of the lease because the Miller 
affidavits so state "their" understanding. (R.222) 
11. The Court did not find that the lease was 
unconscionable at the time it was entered into or that it 
became unconscionable because of subsequent events. 
(R.223) 
12. Additionally, in reviewing similar language 
in a similar lease in another case it was stated that this 
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language "does not appear to be ambiguous or misleading". 
(R.42) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The decision of the Lower Court granting 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be affirmed 
because there are no genuine issues as to any material 
fact in the instant case and the Defendant is entitled to 
a Judgment as a matter of law. The lease agreement 
between the parties is not ambiguous. The provision in 
the lease which provides for a continuation of the term of 
the lease is set forth clearly, using correct English 
rules of construction and was properly interpreted by the 
Lower Court. 
The lease is not illusory nor unconscionable. 
Both parties to the lease have certain obligations that 
they are required to perform, or otherwise comply with, as 
well as receiving mutual benefits from the agreement. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
There Are No Genuine Issues as to Any Material Facts 
The Standard of review by an appellant court of 
a summary judgment is the same as that of the trial court: 
Our inquiry on review is whether there is 
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any genuine issue as to any material fact, 
and if there is not, whether the plaintiffs 
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
• . . . The defendant cannot rely upon the 
mere allegations or denials of her pleadings 
to avoid a summary judgment but must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is 
a genuine issue for trial. 
Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979). See 
also Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281 (Utah App. 1987) (on 
reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court applies 
the same standard as that applied by the trial court); 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
requires that a motion for summary judgment shall be 
granted if the: 
pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact . . . 
Utah's Supreme Court has held that a genuine issue of 
facts exists whenever reasonable minds can differ. In 
Jackson v. Dadney, 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982). The opponent 
to summary judgment must affirmatively set forth genuine 
issues of fact. Rule 56(e) 
In opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Plaintiff attempted to cloud the genuine issues 
by presenting three affidavits, which are appended as 
Exhibits "D", "E", and lfFff to Appellant's Brief. These 
Affidavits do not raise any genuine issue of fact, but 
instead present incompetent evidence to the Court. 
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Rule 56(e) requires that Affidavits be based on 
personal knowledge, setting forth "such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence*" Appellant's Affidavits are 
replete with hearsay evidence, many of the statements 
prefaced by "I was told . . ."or "I learned from . . . ." 
Such statements are contrary to the Rules of Evidence, and 
raise no genuine issues of fact. 
Plaintiff also submitted title insurance 
policies and attorney letters to show the duration of the 
Lease. Such evidence is mere private interpretation of 
the Lease Agreement. It is the duty of the Court, not 
some title company or attorney, to interpret the terms of 
the Lease Agreement. 
On appeal, Appellant's Statement of Facts again 
raise no genuine issues of fact. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.3, 4). Appellant states that she was "informed . . . 
that the billboard lease term was ten years . . .", a 
statement resounding of hearsay. (Appellant's brief, p. 
4, paragraph 3). Even if Appellant were told this 
information, it is not a material fact precluding summary 
judgmpnt. Appellant is a succpssor in interest, and her 
understanding of the contract is of no importance. The 
intent of the contracting parties governs. 
Similarly, no evidence was presented showing 
unconscionability, either at the time of entering the 
contract or at the present time. 
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II 
The Agreement, When Interpreted Using Correct 
English Rules of Construction, Clearly Extends the Lease 
for a Ten-Year Period. 
In her brief, Appellant has reproduced a 
paragraph from the Lease Agreement in question. 
(Appellant's Brief, page 5). Appellant has mistakenly, 
perhaps intentionally, altered the punctuation the the 
crucial paragraph, substituting a comma for a semicolon. 
The paragraph should read: 
This lease shall continue on the same 
terms and conditions for a like successive 
period; thereafter, this lease shall 
continue in full force on the same terms 
and conditions for a like successive 
period or periods, unless lessor delivers 
to lessee notice of termination within 
ninety days of the end of said term. 
Lease Agreement, paragraph 4. 
The semicolon in this phrase is a proverbial 
linchpin—without it, the entire paragraph is subject to 
modification by the last 17 worrls. with thp correct 
punctuation, only the post-semicolon clause is so 
modified. 
A contract must be interpreted in accordance 
with the generally prevailing meanings and rules of 
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language. See Restatement 2d of Contracts, 
paragraph(3)(a), and comments thereunder. This principal 
has been recognized by the Utah Supreme Court, 
Generally speaking, neither of the parties, 
nor the court has any right to ignore or 
modify conditions which are clearly expressed 
merely because it may subject one of the 
parties to hardship, but they must be enforced 
"in accordance with the intentions . . . 
manifest by the language used by the parties 
to the contract." 
Ephraim Theatre Company v. Hawk, 321 P.2d 221, 223, (Utah 
1958) . 
"Language" includes not only words, but also 
methods of combining words. Webster's Ninth New 
Collegiate Dictionary, p. 672. Clearly, punctuation is 
part of the English language in written form. 
A court cannot ignore punctuation when 
interpreting a contract. Baker v. McDel Corp., 191 N.W.2d 
846, 851 (Wis. 1971). It is fair to assume that parties 
to a contract know and understand grammar, punctuation, 
words, phrases, and clauses chosen by them to convey the 
purpose of their contract. St. Louis - San Francisco 
Railway Co. v. Bengal Lumber, Co., 292 P.2d 52, 53 (Okla. 
1930. A semicolon is significant when interpreting a 
contract. See Western Empire Petroleum Company v. 
Davenport, 318 S.W.2d 903, 904 (Tex. App. 1958). 
The paragraph in question is made of a single 
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compound sentence that includes two independent clauses 
joined by a semicolon and adverb. Each of the clauses 
could individually make a complete sentence, i.e., "This 
lease shall continue on the same terms and conditions for 
a like successive period. This lease shall continue in 
full force on the same terms and conditions for a like 
successive period or periods, unless the lessor delivers 
to the lessee notice of termination within 90 days of the 
end of said term." Grammatically, the two clauses are 
complete and independent one from the other. The second 
clause does not modify the first clause. 
Furthermore, the two clauses cannot be joined 
into a compound sentence unless a semicolon is used. A 
comma is inappropriate. 
If two or more clauses grammatically complete 
and not joined by a conjunction are to form 
a single compound sentence, the proper mark of 
punctuation is a semicolon . . . . 
Note that if the second clause is preceded by an 
adverb, such as accordingly, besides, then, 
therefore, or thus, and not by a conjunction, 
the semicolon is still required. 
The Elements of Stylo, "trunk and White, 3rd 
Edition, McMillan Publishing Co., Inc., New York, 1979. 
Webster further clarifies the proper use of the 
semicolon. 
In general the semicolon functions as a weak 
period or as a strong comma . . . . 
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As a weak period a semicolon usually separates 
two statements or clauses when the second begins 
with a sentence connector or conjunctive adverb 
as . . . therefore . . . 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, p. 49a 
In the paragraph in question, the semicolon is a 
"weak period", showing the independency of the two 
clauses. The two clauses are joined by a semicolon and 
the adverb "therefore", making one compound sentence, but 
in no way affecting the independency of the two clauses. 
The correct interpretation of the language of 
the contract leads to but one conclusion, that is, the 
lease is still in full force and effect. The lease 
agreement was for an initial period of ten years. (Lease, 
paragraph 3), Upon expiration of the first ten-year 
period, the lease continues for a successive ten-year 
period. (Lease, paragraph 4, Clause 1, before semicolon). 
There is no provision allowing the Lessor to terminate the 
lease until the expiration of the second ten-year period, 
at which time the lessor may opt to terminate with 
adequate notice. (Lease, paragraph 4, Clause 2, following 
semicolon). 
Finally, the Washington Supreme Court has 
recognized the importance of punctuation. 
It is urged that the comma is the lowest and 
least significant of all punctuation marks 
and that in this case it should simply be 
eliminated or moved to the right three words. 
We must confess, however, to a very high regard 
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for the lowly comma. When a contract has a 
clear and certain meaning, we will not, in the 
absence of fraud or mutual mistake, neither of 
which is supported here, make a new contract 
for the parties be eliminating a comma or 
moving it a certain number of words to the right 
or left. 
Peters v. Watson Co., 241 P.2d 441 (Wash. 1952). 
Plaintiff/Appellant should not be permitted to 
redraft the contract by eliminating the efficacious 
semicolon. 
Ill 
The Lease is not Ambiguous 
Appellant contests that the language of 
paragraph 4 of the lease is ambiguous, unconscionable, and 
creates a perpetual lease. She argues that the ambiguity 
of the paragraph is proven by the fact that she personally 
reviewed the lease, obtained legal opinions, reviewed the 
title report and received assurances from her seller, 
Gloria Erickson. It is interesting to note that 
she, at no time prior to the initiation of these 
proceedings, contacted Reacran Outdoor Advertising to 
determine its understanding of its rights and liabilities 
under this particular lease agreement were. 
Personal and professional review of a contract 
does not alter the original intent of the parties and the 
legal, binding effect of the writing. Even the best 
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attorney in town takes a back seat to a judge when it 
comes to interpreting a legal document. A judge is also 
bound to construe the document according to age-old rules 
of interpretation. Attorney opinions sought that the 
lessor could terminate the lease after the first ten year 
term is an argument that is at best tenuous. On this 
point, the law is clear—it is not a defense to rely on 
the advice and counsel of an attorney contrary to law. See 
7 Am.Jur.2d Section 201, Attorneys at Law (1980) (in 
absence of express agreement, an attorney is not an 
insurer or guarantor of the soundness of his opinion, or 
of the successful outcome of litigation, or of the 
validity of an instrument he is engaged to draft); and 
Young v. Bridwell, 437 P.2d 686 (1968). (Counsel is 
required to possess the ordinary legal knowledge and skill 
common to members of his profession, but he is not 
required to know all of the law, nor to second guess the 
trial judge). 
Miller has failed to set forth facts to support 
the contention that the lease is ambiguous. Instead, she 
has merely alleged ambiqui. < y. Appellant cites Russell v, 
Valentine, 376 P.2d 548 (1962) for the premise that when 
lease renewal provisions are not clear they should be 
construed against the drafter. Appellant argues that this 
case is applicable to the case at bench, but she fails to 
pinpoint the ambiguity. 
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The Valentine case is distinguishable from the 
present case, because the language of the present lease 
agreement is clear and unequivocal. In Valentine, the 
controversial language of the lease stated that "said 
Lessee shall have the right to renew this lease for a 
further period beginning as of the termination of this 
lease." The court, construing this language held: 
The crux of the matter is the phrase "for 
a further period." We agree with defendant, 
and plaintiff so concedes, that had the 
renewal provision not contained these words 
it could be construed as a "general covenant 
to renew" for an additional term of ten 
years. . . . However, the lease provision 
does contain the phrase and it could have a 
variety of meanings. "For a further period" 
could mean one day, one week, one month, one 
year, and so on. The phrase renders the 
provision so ambiguous and uncertain that 
its meaning and the intention of the parties 
must be sought outside the four corners of 
the lease. 
Id. at 549. 
The language under consideration in this case 
does not render the lease so ambiguous and uncertain. 
"For a like successive period," unlike "for a further 
period," clearly indicates that the period has only one 
meaning—a succeeding ten year term under identical terms 
as the preceding one. Consequently, summary judgment was 
proper in this case, because the terms are clear and 
unambiguous and reasonable minds could differ as to this 
fact. As this court held in Colonial Leasing Co. v. 
Larsen Bros. Construction, 731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986): 
Only when contract terms are complete, 
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clear, and unambiguous can they be 
interpreted by the judge on a motion for 
summary judgment. . . . If the evidence 
as to the terms of the agreement is in 
conflict, the intent of the parties as to 
the terms of the agreement is to be 
determined by the jury. 
Id. at 488. 
A case that is on point is Hampton v. Lum, 544 
S.W.2d 839 (Civ. Ct. App. Tex. 1976), where the Lower 
Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant/ 
Tenant. The single point of error urged on appeal was 
over a lease provision very similar to the one in this 
case. The provision read: 
"at the expiration of the original 
lease term herein, this lease shall 
automatically renew for a like term 
unless either party gives thirty (30) 
days written notice to the contrary" 
(emphasis added) 
Id. at 840. 
The court stated: "Appellant urges that the 
words like term in paragraph 14 renders the provisions of 
the paragraph ambiguous, unclear and meaningless." Id. 
The court rejected the appellant's argument and held that: 
"Neither the words 1 i k e t e r m nm; i he paragraph in which 
they appear renders the agreement ambiguous, vague or 
meaningless." Id. Instead, the court found that the 
phrase "like term" had a clear and understandable meaning: 
As the word is used in the context shown 
term means the interest or estate created 
by the lease instrument and the estate's 
duration. In using the words like term 
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in paragraph 14, the parties agree that 
at the expiration therein and its duration 
of twelve months would automatically renew. 
Id. See also Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292 (Utah 
1983) (when a contract is clear on its face, extraneous or 
parole evidence is generally not admissible to explain the 
intent of the contract). 
Similarly, the subject of controversy in this 
case is the phrase "like successive period" and/or "said 
term". Plaintiff argues that the phrase are ambiguous 
and, should be construed against the maker of the 
instrument. However, much like the situation in Lum, 
"Like successive period" is not ambiguous but clearly 
creates a renewal at the expiration of the first period, 
in this case ten years. 
The word "period" is the equivalent of "term". 
Lum; see also Martinez v. Rocky Mountain & San Francisco 
Railway Co., 47 P.2d 903 (N.M. 1935) (the lexicographers 
generally give "period" as a synonym of "term"). Any 
reference to "said term" is the same as a reference to 
"said period". The word "successive" means automatic, 
without any gap or time lapse between the initial period 
and the following one. As held by one court, "Successive 
is synonymous with 'consecutive' and means 'following each 
other or another without interruption or interval.'" 
Copher v. Barbee, 361 S.W.2d 137, 145 (Ct.App.Mo. 1962). 
Thus, the phrase "for like successive period" even more 
clearly sets forth what the court held in Lum—that the 
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lease was intended to renew automatically, without 
interval, for an identical, subsequent period. 
IV 
The Lease is Not Illusory or Unconscionable 
The lease agreement is not illusory. Reagan 
Outdoor Advertising is obligated to pay quarterly rent 
payments or else it is in breach of the lease. Appellant 
would have sufficient legal remedies to terminate the 
contract upon Reagan's breach. Reagan Outdoor Advertising 
is obligated to pay the lease payments whether the sign is 
in use or not, and Reagan cannot terminate the lease on 
its whim. The contract expressly penalizes Reagan for its 
termination, requiring the payment of one year's rent as a 
penalty. Furthermore, Reagan would have a legal duty to 
remove its structure from the property, at its own cost. 
The contract cannot be deemed illusory because if Reagan 
were to terminate, monetary and other obligations arise by 
contract and by law. 
The argument made by the appellant could likely 
be made with regard to almost any contractual agreement. 
Courts have dealt with this by simply providing a 
requirement that all parties are expected to deal with 
each other in good faith . Mel Hardman Productions, Inc., 
v. Robinson, 604 P.2d 913 (Utah 1979). See also Resource 
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Management Company v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Company/ 
Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 1037 (Utah 1985). The issue of 
Reagan Outdoor Advertising's potential breach of the lease 
agreement is not before the court-
Appellant has attempted to make it appear that 
Reagan Outdoor Advertising is getting something for 
nothing. This is simply not the case. The instant lease 
is an arrangement that not only lays certain obligations 
on both of the parties but provides a benefit for both 
parties. 
Furthermore, an agreement is not invalid, simply 
because it gives a lone party the right to terminate the 
lease. Marcrum v. Eambry, 262 Ala. 406, 282 So.2nd 49,52 
(1873). Nor, is a lease invalid simply because a lessor 
cannot terminate the lease until the end of the second 
renewal period. It is not necessary that every covenant 
in a contract be equal for the consideration of mutuality 
to be sufficient. Warren v. Ray County Cole Co., 207 S.W. 
883, 200 Mo. App. 442 (1919). 
Miller also a reruns l-h^t- f.ho lease is 
unconscionable, because "it is terminable at the will of 
one party, the option of the Defendant, and is so 
one-sided as to destroy any implied good faith 
limitation." 
Appellant relies on the case of Resource 
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Management Company v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Company 
Inc., supra. That case divides unconscionability into two 
categories: 
Recognition of these purposes has led 
to an analysis of unconscionability 
in terms of "substantive" and 
"procedural" unconscionability. 
"Substantive unconscionability" 
examines the relative fairness of 
the obligations assumed. "Procedure 
unconscionability" focuses on the 
manner in which the contract was 
negotiated and the circumstances of 
the parties. 
Id. at 1041. 
The critical juncture for determining whether a 
contract is unconscionable is a moment when it is entered 
into by both parties. Id. at 1043. 
The lower court specifically looked at 
unconscionability not only when the agreement is entered 
into by the original parties but also during that period 
of time since the agreement was executed. There is no 
factual basis for unconscionability in either instance. 
The Appellant also fails to show how the Resource 
Management Company case has a direct application to the 
instantcase. 
The term of the lease under question is not lost 
in a multi-page document. The entire lease is only one 
page that can be read meticulously in five minutes. There 
is no fine print, nor shoddy draftsmanship. The agreement 
was negotiated, as evidenced by the hand-written term 
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requiring Reagan to provide a "canopy for Jennings front 
window." The language "for like successive period" does 
not employ arcane legalese; instead it uses simple, plain, 
straight-forward English. To argue that such language was 
skillfully drafted to be incomprehensible to a lay person 
is a lacks any legal or factual support. 
Appellant argues that the instrument is 
substantively unconscionable, because, relying on the 
language of Resource Management Company, it is so one-
sided. Here again, there is nothing on the record to 
support such an allegation. According to the court in 
Resource Management Company, "substantive 
unconscionability is indicated by contract terms so one-
sided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an innocent 
party." Id. at 1041. The affidavit of A.J. Reagan 
clearly states that the original lessor had an opportunity 
to read the document and to discuss its terms. (R.39) 
That the original lessor understood its terms 
and was not oppressed or unfairly surprised by its terms 
is also evidenced by the harcrairu ncr between the parties, 
the result of which is handwritten on the lease. How the 
original lessor induced his successors in interest into 
purchasing the land is a different matter entirely. Both 
successors had an opportunity to read the language of the 
lease before they purchased the land. Both appear to have 
simply relied upon the hasty advice of title companies and 
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attorneys. 
Miller cited the case of Logan v. Time Oil 
Company, 437 Po2d 192 (Wash. 1968), for the proposition 
that the provision the ten-year extension lacked in 
mutuality. Logan is a three paragraph decision, issued 
PER CURRIAM without any disclosure of the rationale for 
the decision. It's hardly dispositive of the issue, and 
is not binding case law. A reading of this case fails t 
provide any information that would be helpful in the cas 
at bar. 
V 
Reagan Outdoor Advertising Is Entitled To 
Judgment As A Matter Of Law 
Even if the court finds that there is an issue 
as to some material fact(s), summary judgment is still 
proper when the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
matter of law. See Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 
P.2d 1390 (Utah 1980) (summary iudqment is appropriate 
even if some facts remain in dispute if a material fact 
genuinely controverted). As this court held in Themy v. 
Seagull Enterprises, Inc., 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1979): 
We consider the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the losing party, and affirm 
only where it appears there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material issues of fact, 
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or where, even according to the facts as 
contended by the losing party, the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. 
Id. 529. See also Thornick, 604 P.2d at 934 (on review, 
the court must determine whether there is any genuine 
issue as to any material fact, and if not, whether the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law). 
The interpretation of contractual language is a 
matter of law: 
The accepted principle is that the inter-
pretation of a contracts language is 
usually a matter of law. . . If its terms 
are clear and unambiguous, summary 
judgment is proper. Even where some 
ambiguity exists in the contract, 
resolution of the ambiguity is still a 
question of law for the court. 
Overson v. W.S. Fidelity & Guaranty, Co., 587 P.2d 149, 
151 (Utah 1978), citing Central Credit Collection Control 
Corp. v. Grayson, 7 Wash. App 56, 499 P.2d 57 (1972). 
Consequently, even if the court accepts the general 
allegations of the Plaintiff, it is still a question of 
law for the court and not for the jury. 
Judge Uno found in his Amended Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law that the contract was not 
"unconscionable at the time the lease was signed." 
Conclusions of Law, Paragraph no. 7; and that there was 
"no ambiguity in the phrase for a 'like successive 
period.'" Conclusions of Law, Paragraph no. 9. There is 
nothing to indicate that these conclusions are 
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unwarranted. Consequently, this court should uphold the 
decision of Judge Uno. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Uno's order granting Reagan Outdoor 
Advertising's Motion for Summary Judgment should be 
affirmed. The language of the agreement, when construed 
in accordance with the rules of English, shows that the 
lease was to continue for one successive ten-year term on 
the same conditions as the first ten-year term. Lessor's 
right to terminate the agreement arises only after 
completion of the second term, as evidenced by the 
post-semicolon clause in paragraph 4 of the Agreement. 
Only the latter clause allows the lessor to terminate, and 
the latter clause is of no effect until after two 
successive ten-year terms. 
Appellant has not raised any material issues of 
fact that would preclude summary judgment in favor of 
Respondent. Many of the points raised by Appellant, even 
if material, are based on pvi.flotu-o I Inf- would be 
inadmissible at trial. The Agreement can be interpreted 
as a matter of law, and there has been no evidence to show 
that the written agreement does not document the intent of 
the contracting parties. As a result, the contract, as a 
matter of law, must be interpreted as the agreement and 
24 
intent of the parties. 
Mr DATED this l(r?>-
day of December, 1988. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Douglas T. Hall 
Attorney for Respondent 
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